Sunday, September 15, 2013

Fragmentary Heroes

Some book series cannot be read exactly once. I’ve never met anyone, for instance, who has read The Lord of the Rings one time and one time only. If they’ve opened up the trilogy to begin it at all, they’ve either read it multiple times or given up on it before finishing it the first time through. I’m one of the few people I know who has read the Harry Potter series once (all the others being over forty). And as far as I can tell from online sources, Trollope’s Barchester Chronicles works the same way. Of course everyone who has read the six-novel set multiple times had to have, at one time in history, read it only once. But they don’t seem to write about it online at that point in their lives. I, on the other hand, because I’ve committed to blogging about my ten-year adventure, must share my impressions with the world before finishing the series, and even in the middle of each of the books.

Today, I’m just over halfway through The Little House at Allington, so I don’t know how it’s going to turn out. But based on my experiences with ten other Anthony Trollope novels, I’ll enjoy the ending, whatever it proves to be. Right now, I’m fascinated with the diverging judgments of two characters on parallel courses. Adolphus Crosbie has become engaged to two women within two weeks, without even breaking off the first engagement before making the second offer. Johnny Eames also has professed his love to two different women, although without formal engagements, and has even kissed one of them. The two story arcs aren’t all that different: neither character understands himself, and both say things to women that they immediately regret. And yet Trollope treats the first as a scoundrel and the second as an endearing “hobbledehoy.”

So far, that is. I’m keeping an open mind. Trollope may reverse either judgment, or both, before tying up the threads. He tells the reader up front that the book has more than one hero, or rather that “that part in the drama will be cut up, as it were, into fragments.” And since he says this while introducing Mr Crosbie, he seems to imply that Mr Crosbie will play the role of one of those fragmentary heroes. So I’m ready to forgive him, since I know that Trollope might forgive him (dramatically speaking), as well.

And that knowledge lies at the foundation of my love for this now-neglected Victorian author. Ironically, the man whose narrations admit to the imaginary status of the characters they portray, ends up delivering surprisingly realistic people. And that means that anything can happen. My beloved Dickens would probably treat the man who engages himself to two women at the same time as a bounder, a cad who gets his just deserts at the end of the story. But Anthony Trollope, by presenting two fickle-hearted characters in the same book and showing that the difference between shameful and forgivable conduct is one of degree, invites the reader to see each weak-willed character as one of us and to show mercy. What other author writes such psychological, internal drama, puts all the suspense and mystery within the human heart, and yet leaves us shaking our heads in good-natured sympathy? It’s as if Dostoevsky had decided to try to make us chuckle.

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

Kant Improves with Age

At least since William James’s time, we’ve known that some of human memory is recorded outside the brain. Common parlance refers to “muscle memory,” although I think the pertinent sciences would actually place motor memory in the nervous system. More than this, though, I’ve had to accept the fact that significant portions of my memory reside outside my body altogether, in my notes. I’m not as bad off as the fellow from Memento, who can’t hold any memories internally for more than about ten minutes and has to tattoo the information he wants to retain onto his skin. But I’m amazed and humbled sometimes when I look over my reading notes to find lines in my handwriting that I don’t remember writing, about ideas I don’t remember reading or even ever thinking about.

When I opened up Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason a couple of weeks ago, I was extremely glad to find the notes I had taken the first time I read the book, almost ten years ago. They guided me as I made my way through the dense material for a second time, and it seemed to me as I read that I’d done a good job summarizing and restating the main points of the work. But it disappointed me to discover (a) that I hadn’t remembered most of what I had written down in 2004 and (b) that several of the memories I did have of the Critique were wrong. Or maybe I just picked up different details this time, but Kant's views on happiness and God, especially, seemed different during this second reading – and different in a good way.

I had remembered accurately that Kant said the only reasonable ethical motive is duty, not pleasure. We can’t award anyone any bonus virtue points for helping out people just because she likes helping people, Kant says; that seemingly kind person is really only trying to make herself feel better. And I remembered that he didn’t want to credit anyone as acting from duty if any feelings of happiness at all crept into the situation. But remembering only those details left me thinking that Kant saw the virtuous life as sober and unpleasant. What I didn’t remember is that he relented in a couple of ways to find a place for happiness in his scheme. First, he admits that children should be trained in proper moral behavior by rewards and punishment; let the understanding of duty come later. Second, he admitted that a just God will reward a good life with eternal happiness even though he looked with suspicion (with some right, I think) on the man who serves God only to get the happy reward.

Another change. The Kantian God that I remembered was a cold, distant, impersonal cipher, a mere philosophical “postulate” whose existence we have to accept in order to provide a ground for our sense of right and wrong. But then last week I noticed that Kant clearly outlined the limitations of philosophy to say much about God’s character, and the need for revelation to fill in more details. He even cited passages in Romans both as samples of that needed revelation and as support for the doctrine that natural theology can only get us so far. And citing the Bible, of course, implicitly opened the door to all its teaching of the personal, relational attributes of its God. I finished up thinking of the book not as offering the tiny, disappointing sum of everything that can be known about God’s moral will, but as the philosophical grounding for accepting everything that God reveals about it.

So Kant has improved with (my) age. And yes, I took notes on the changes, and the next time I read those notes, I can say I remember what I learned.

Wednesday, September 4, 2013

What Makes a Good Gentleman

In the preface to Mere Christianity, C. S. Lewis mourns a change he observed in the use of the word “gentleman.” No longer using the term to refer to a person of a well-defined class, some people in Lewis’s time apparently called a person a “gentleman” if he behaved in a praiseworthy manner. The problem, Lewis argues, is that such a definition makes the word useless; it moves “gentleman” from the objective realm to that of the subjective, and applies it to a situation for which we already have words. While it’s difficult for an American to appreciate the issue, Lewis says it’s much better to let the word remain as a reference to a man of certain property holdings and, if he misbehaves, call him a “bad gentleman.”

Implied in that argument is that to be a good gentleman requires both the right breeding and the right behavior. In The City of God, Augustine adds a third ingredient. In book XI, he says that to be good at anything (“anything” presumably including being a gentleman), one needs ability, education, and practice. In parallel passages, he uses the terms power, knowledge, and purpose. It seems obvious to me. I will never be able to type quickly because I don’t have the right fingers. I can’t speak Mandarin because, although I have the tongue and lips required, I don’t have the knowledge. And I can’t speak Italian well because, while I learned some before spending a semester in Italy, I haven’t put what little I know it into practice for over a year.

Imagine what Plato’s dialogs would have been like if Socrates had thought along these lines. He wouldn’t have said over and over that someone knowing what’s right will do it. After all, what if this educated person hasn’t practiced doing the right thing? What if she doesn’t even have the natural or spiritual ability to do the right thing? Where would drug education or “safe” sex education in this country be if the Emma Pillsburies of the world knew students needed power and purpose in addition to the “facts” printed in their cliché-ridden posters and brochures?

Having just read these passages in Lewis and Augustine the last couple of months, I’ve been thinking about ability, education, and practice a lot. And Jane Austen made me really happy by chiming in to the conversation with certain passages in Pride and Prejudice that resonate with Augustine’s trifold analysis. Darcy feels shame at Lady Catherine’s “ill-breeding,” suggesting that, even supposing titles truly indicate a natural aptitude (element no. 1) for virtuous action, aptitude will atrophy without practice (element no. 3). But, of course, Austen doesn’t believe that only aristocrats have noble natures, since her most sympathetic characters almost always reside in the middle class. P & P deals with education (element no. 2) in its picture of the Bennett girls. The narrator calls Elizabeth’s youngest sisters “silly and ignorant.” Since they inherit the same natural ability from their parents that Elizabeth does, their silliness can only be blamed on their lack of education. And Elizabeth says that the girls were all urged to read and that “such of us as wished to learn” could do so easily. So the younger siblings’ ignorance might be blamed on their failure to put into practice their father’s instructions. On the flip side, both Mary and Mr Collins have all the education one could want and end up intolerable prigs.

In my previous post, I said that Jane Austen didn’t seem like a Radical although she indulged in various forms of moderate subversion. But by making natural aptitude independent of pedigree and by demonstrating that virtue requires nurture and practice in addition to nature, she puts a powder keg under the intrenched class system’s insistence that blood will surely tell.

Sunday, September 1, 2013

Jane Austen, Subversive

Jane Austen certainly doesn’t look like a political Radical to me. Her novels center on characters from the landed gentry, and the final happiness of the books’ heroines always includes an income derived from the labor of others. But she doesn’t just accept the social structure and morality of her times, either. Her subversive streak, in fact, shows through in several places in Pride and Prejudice.

Austen’s criticism of her world can sound quite gentle at times, as when she pokes fun at her characters’ narrow field of interest. When Charlotte Lucas suggests that the four evenings of social interaction shared by Elizabeth’s sister and a visiting man may well have started a real romance, Elizabeth replies, “Yes; these four evenings have enabled them to ascertain that they both like Vingt-un better than Commerce.” In other words, agreeing on the game that will accompany typically insipid conversation hardly assures a lifetime of wedded bliss.

Elizabeth is, of course, a reader. Austen’s lead characters usually are readers, and their friends usually don’t understand it, and Mr. Right usually reveals himself to the reader by being the one person (other than, perhaps, the heroine’s father) who appreciates the mind of the central female character. In one scene, Mr. Bingley outlines the standard view of an “accomplished” woman:
A woman must have a thorough knowledge of music, singing, drawing, dancing, and the modern languages, to deserve the word; and besides all this, she must possess a certain something in her air and manner of walking, the tone of her voice, her address and expressions, or the word will be but half-deserved.
But then Mr. Darcy, as early as the 11% mark (thank you, Kindle!), seals his fate as hero of the novel and complements both Elizabeth and all his female readers by responding, “And to all this she must yet add something more substantial, in the improvement of her mind by extensive reading.” To declare education an essential point of an accomplished woman does a lot more to overturn early nineteenth-century convention than an observation on games. But I don’t suppose it caused too much of a scandal at the time: certainly all the contemporary women who read the passage agreed that contemporary women should have education sufficient for reading.

Even more bold is Austen’s declaration of the fallibility of the aristocracy. Lady Catherine de Bourgh struts through the pages expecting everyone to show her the deference due to her noble nature. But even her own nephew sees her flaws. Lady Catherine, knowing that la noblesse oblige, invites Elizabeth to come every day and play the piano, but only in a back room where she will “be in nobody’s way.” The author tells us that Mr. Darcy looked “ashamed of his aunt’s ill-breeding.” Ill-breeding? Doesn’t the aristocracy define themselves precisely as people of pure breeding?

Austen hints at undermining a point of morality in Elizabeth’s reaction to her sister Lydia’s upcoming marriage. Lydia, enamored of every man in a military uniform, finally runs off with one, to the dismay of everyone else in her family, including Elizabeth. We don’t know what outcome Elizabeth would prefer, but when the unscrupulous officer agrees to marriage two months later, she comments on the irony that she perceives:
“And they are really to be married!” cried Elizabeth, as soon as they were by themselves. “How strange this is! And for this we are to be thankful. That they should marry, small as is their chance of happiness, and wretched as is his character, we are forced to rejoice. Oh, Lydia!”
In some of my favorite moments, Austen turns on her own kind to overturn literary assumptions. When Mrs. Bennett tells a story of a man who dropped his suit for Jane after writing her some verses, Elizabeth explains, “And so ended his affection. . . . I wonder who first discovered the efficacy of poetry in driving away love!” So much for that romantic cliché. Austen even reveals twice that she may be damaging her own book by not following the usual course of a novel’s stream. When Elizabeth starts to feel love for Darcy after a long bout with prejudice, the narrator admits that love at first sight is a more interesting “mode of attachment.” Okay, obviously Austen says it tongue-in-cheek, knowing full well – and knowing that we know that she knows – that Elizabeth’s drawn out story is much more interesting. Elizabeth herself gets a chance to criticize her creator in a conversation with Mr. Darcy near the end of the book. The two have finally found the freedom to profess love for one another, but only because Elizabeth has brought up a subject she had said she wouldn’t speak about. And “what becomes of the moral,” Elizabeth asks, “if our comfort springs from a breach of promise?” What! A mere lifetime of happiness between two people of education and good character bound by love based on kindness, gratitude, and esteem comes at the expense of a breach of minor etiquette? Jane Austen, you’re really playing with fire now!

Friday, August 30, 2013

The Finitude of Spinoza

I reread most of Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics this week, and I have to say that he’s grown on me steadily over the years. In my first encounter with Spinoza, during a college philosophy class when I was twenty-something, I couldn’t believe anybody had ever taken him seriously at all, much less that philosophers still pondered his ideas. Then during the first Ten-Year Plan, the reading schedule that came with my set of Britannica Great Books, I read the whole Ethics a little bit at a time, and my interest and respect increased a little with each assignment. If Mortimer Adler hadn’t told me to read the book out of order over the course of about six years, I might have enjoyed it even more and even more quickly.

In that philosophy class, we mostly just talked about Spinoza’s pantheistic metaphysic. Essentially, he says that since God is infinite substance, He must be the only substance. Any other existing thing would put a limit on God. You and I and everything we see or know about, then, only seem to be separate existences; we are all actually just “modes” of the one infinite, existing Substance. That argument seems to me to make sense only if there is some kind of metaphysical space that substances occupy the way that material objects each occupy part of physical space. An infinitely large spatial object must be the only spatial object, because it would fill all of space, and two objects (so they once told us) cannot occupy the same space. But does existence itself work that way? The only limitation I can see that my mere existence puts on God is that it means something exists that He is not: He is not the thing that is not God. And that tautology doesn’t seem like a limitation I should worry about any more than the “limitation” of God not being able to make a rock so large He can’t move it. God can’t logically be what He isn’t, so it doesn’t limit Him to say that He can’t possibly be what He isn’t.

But this year, I read through that first part of the book again, chuckled a bit, and then moved on. After all, Spinoza seems to build on the idea only to say that God is sovereign over everything that exists and happens, and then to explore the tension of freedom and determinism, an important issue in almost any metaphysic. But then I ran into another snag: I couldn’t tell if Spinoza thinks humans have any freedom of choice or not. He says at first that we are so determined that all freedom is an illusion. We have no actual individual faculty of will, desire, or understanding. We only think we’re free because we are aware of our actions and thoughts and think that we have chosen them. In the last part of the book, though, he discusses the liberty that understanding can bring us, saying there that thinking correctly can deliver us from the determinism of the affections (joy, anger, pride, pleasure, etc.). First we have no freedom at all. Then we have the freedom to seek our freedom. What a muddle!

The farther I read, though, the more I saw the contradiction as a strength. As much as Spinoza tries to present his philosophy in a format as tightly logical as a geometry book, the human condition just can’t be boiled down to definitive theorems. Maybe I misunderstood him (at three different times in my life) when I read him say that freedom is an illusion. But if he simply flat contradicted himself from the urge to speak honestly about human life, I admire him for his humility. And after all, how much should I want to complain about a book that ends by teaching that we should repay evil actions in love?

Saturday, August 24, 2013

Bacon and Aristotle

The introduction to my edition of Francis Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning says that Bacon developed a dislike for the philosophy of Aristotle during his years at Trinity College, Cambridge. So he surprised me by referring so often to Aristotle in the book and by basing some of his most interesting ideas on Aristotle’s theory of four causes.

Bacon certainly gets his digs in on his Greek predecessor here and there. In his outline of all possible subjects of knowledge, Bacon naturally comes to the field of ethics, and in this section he upbraids Aristotle for neglecting to mention anything about the effect of temperaments and affections on moral judgment. He admits that Aristotle “touched upon” the affections in the Rhetoric and in a few other scattered places, “but they were never incorporate into moral philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain.”

He also derides the classic treatment of logic for having no bearing on practical life. Bacon includes logic in his taxonomy of learning, but he relegates it to an obscure position that I classified in my outlined notes as C.3.a.ii.β.1.B, where C) stands for the general topic of philosophy, 3) for human philosophy, a) for philosophy of individual humans (as opposed to politics, for instance), ii) for knowledge of the mind (as opposed to knowledge of the body), β) for the faculties of the mind (as opposed to substance or nature of the mind), 1) for rational (as opposed to moral) functions of the mind, and B) for the judgment of rational ideas.

But Bacon appears perfectly comfortable with Aristotle’s theory of the four causes: material, efficient, formal, and final. We tend to define cause only in terms of the efficient and final causes. If I ask, “Why is the tire flat?” I’m looking for an efficient cause. Perhaps I drove over a nail, and the hole caused the flat tire. But if I ask, “Why did you go to the store?” I don’t expect my wife to answer, “Because I put myself in the car and pointed it in that direction.” I’m not asking here about the efficient cause, the actions that resulted in her motion; I’m really asking about her purpose or goal. I don’t want to know what happened before that led her to go but what she hoped would happen after getting to the store. Maybe she went to buy milk, for instance.

To explain the other causes, Aristotle uses (somewhere) an example of a table. In his theory, a cause of thing X is whatever must exist in order for X to exist. What all must exist in order for this table to exist? First, the wood it’s made of must exist. In everyday parlance, we don’t tend to think of wood causing the table’s existence, but considering cause as a necessary condition suddenly makes the existence of wood a quite obvious cause. Second, the table’s existence depends on a table maker and his act of table making: the efficient causes. Third, the table must have a plan or design: the formal cause. A carpenter randomly sawing and hammering won’t produce a table. Fourth, the table has to have a final cause, a purpose. Put a carpenter, some wood, and a blueprint in a room, and still no table will come to be if the carpenter sees no need for the table. The most obvious purpose for the table is to support lamps and vases and dinner plates. But the final cause might also include the carpenter’s need to make money or simply his desire to exercise and display his skills.

Francis Bacon makes two intriguing points out of the theory of causes. First, he posits that since science looks for material and efficient causes, it really doesn’t ever contradict faith, which is directed to formal and final causes. I don’t know that any part of that explanation is completely true, but I admire his attempt, at the beginning of the Scientific Revolution, to clarify that the movement was not, as far as he and other Christians were concerned, aimed at or in danger of opposing sacred doctrine. Second, Bacon offers a generic plan for each field of study centered on the causes. Knowledge of any subject, he says, is like a four-tiered pyramid. The base of the pyramid comprises history: the pertinent elements, observed facts, and terminology. The second layer, which he terms physic, examines the material and efficient causes. On top of physic lies the metaphysic of the field, knowledge of formal and final causes. The opus Dei, that is, the ways and purposes of God regarding the subject matter, we may never know, he says, but still stands conceptually at the apex of the pyramid.

I planned at first to speculate on applications of this model to several topics. But the post has already gone on too long, so I’ll just experiment with one. Knowledge of literature might fit into the pyramidal scheme in this way. The history of literature would consist of, well, the bare facts of the history of literature, the stuff that would help you play a game of Authors. The physic of literature might delve more deeply into the lives of authors. Who was Dickens or Dante? When did they write their books? Who published them? What social or familial or financial or linguistic influences led to the composition of the work? The metaphysic gets more personal. What themes tie the work together? What did the author hope to accomplish artistically? How does the plot work? How do I, the reader, interpret the characters?

And now, both the excessive length of my post and the alarm on my computer tell me to stop and leave it to the reader to think out more examples.

Tuesday, August 20, 2013

Bacon for Lunch

It happens sometimes. I get excited about a book when I don’t have a lot of time to blog, and then 20%, 40%, or 80% of the way through, I finally get some spare time only to find my head full of more ideas than I can possibly write about before forgetting them all. In the previous post, I wrote some thoughts about a book on the Shakespeare authorship question. I finished the section on Francis Bacon in that book and then remembered that I had Francis Bacon on my reading list for this year. So I jumped ahead a bit to start reading The Advancement of Learning, and now I find my lunch “hour” growing and growing. It’s been so good that when I started this paragraph, I really didn’t know how to select what the rest of the post would concentrate on. So I’ll cheat and not concentrate at all. Instead, here are three disconnected details that really made me happy.

1. In the 1990s, American education suffered the Critical Thinking Movement, an initiative seeking to replace memorization of facts with higher-level cognitive skills such as judgment and synthesis. My critical thinking on the subject, though, tells me that without facts with which to work, one has nothing to judge and synthesize. We mustn’t replace memorization with critical thinking; one leads to the other – or should. Bacon saw the same problem in his time and denounced educational systems that jumped too quickly to logic and rhetoric, the arts of “setting forth and disposing matter.” But, he points out, minds that have no matter have nothing to think about or to express. Beginning with judgment and expression of matter without having acquired any matter to judge or express, Bacon says, is like painting the wind.

I couldn’t help thinking here of Dorothy Sayers’s article called “The Lost Tools of Learning.” Employing the same terms Bacon used, terms from the medieval Trivium, Sayers cites the importance of mastering grammar before proceeding to logic and rhetoric. She defines grammar broadly as the study of the basic facts of each field. Teach children the alphabet, she says, the multiplication table, periods of history, names of animals, capitals of countries, poems, color theory, and key signatures while you can. They can and will argue with you about them and express themselves about them readily enough when they become teenagers.

2. In book II of The Advancement of Learning, Bacon divides up all possible fields of study systematically and tries to give advice on how best to proceed in each area. He begins by making three large classifications according to what he sees as the three “parts of man’s understanding.” History, he says, has reference to the memory, the arts to imagination, and philosophy to reason. History and philosophy sound to us like particular subjects that a typical college student might take a class or two in. But as Bacon defines it, history is as broad as Dorothy Sayers’s grammar. In addition to chronicles of events, it includes taxonomy of plants and animals and minerals and other natural phenomena as well as the mechanical and productive arts. And philosophy includes mathematics, natural sciences, logic, linguistics, metaphysics, and – of course! – music theory.

Now a person can memorize, imagine, and reason about all these topics. But I enjoyed contemplating the basic nature of the division, and Bacon convinced me with his correspondences. Our mind acquires and stores ideas (memory), manipulates and judges ideas (reason), and creates new ideas (imagination). And subject matter generally seems to fall into one of the three categories: concrete things and events that we observe in the world, abstract things that we discover only through thought, and new things that we design and create. The same division could be made on the terms of time: past (memory, history), present (philosophy, reason) and future (imagination, the arts). Or we could call the Trivium into service again, since Bacon’s history corresponds to Sayers’s grammar, logic easily expands to incorporate all that Bacon classes in philosophy, and rhetoric and expression clearly go with imagination and the arts.

3. Bacon foresees and almost prophetically responds to several issues that play a major part in the course of philosophy after his time. First, just when philosophers begin to divide themselves into rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza, etc.) and empiricists (Hobbes, Locke, etc.), Bacon calmly and, as I see it, correctly informs us that both “the notions of the mind and the reports of the senses” provide springs of knowledge. Then, with a short, simple argument he tries to forestall the skepticism that the empiricists would bog down in over the course of the next century or so: the senses may be untrustworthy to a degree, but that doesn’t mean we can’t verify and correct their “reports” with careful measurement and reason. After all, Bacon argues by analogy, the inability of the unaided human hand to draw an accurate circle doesn’t mean we can’t use a compass to achieve that goal. The inaccuracy of the senses isn’t the true source of uncertainty, anyway, he says. All of our knowledge is in the form of arguments made up of propositions consisting of words, and words only betoken the “popular notions of things.” Here Bacon’s observation links way back to the confusion of language at Babel and forward several centuries to the linguistics of Saussure and Derrida.

If I could work the Trivium into that third topic, this post would have a neat theme running through it like warp through woof. (Or maybe it’s woof through warp. I can never remember.) But I can’t work it in, so I’ll have to leave today’s post as three mostly random observations about the book that has kept my mind so animated during lunch the last few days.