Part IV of Gulliver’s Travels contains the most scathing and important satirical critique of humanity in the book. Swift makes his point both by presenting the Yahoos of his imagination and by leading the reader to observe the all-too-real humanity all around us. In between these two groups and setting the standard for the judgment are the Houyhnhnms (in my head, I pronounce it “hooey-hinnums”), a race of intelligent horses.
Yahoo is one of the words that Swift introduced into our language; unlike Gulliver and Lilliputian, though, the word Yahoo, when it comes up in conversation, most likely raises no thoughts of Jonathan Swift in the minds of either speaker or listener. It usually just indicates an actual human who is stupid, crude, or out of control. Its acceptance in the language without ties to its source shows just how successful Swift was in getting his point across. In the novel, the Yahoos are humans without the power of reason. (Okay, they also have a streak of hair down their spines, like the mane of a horse, but otherwise, they’re human.) And it turns out that humans deprived of rational thought are stupid, crude, and out of control. To top it off, they’re possessive hoarders, and their self-centered, brutish squabbles over their possessions are especially cruel, even when compared with those of other animals.
The Houyhnhnms are just as amazed at finding Gulliver as you or I would be at stumbling across Mr. Ed, and they only very slowly come to accept him without having to show constant caution. But even after getting used to him, they find it hard to believe that whole nations of rational Yahoos live elsewhere in the world. So they ask Gulliver to tell them about home. And when he describes war, lawsuits, and crime, the noble equines determine that humans only misuse reason to indulge their natural cruelty and possessiveness. What should lead to peace and happiness, they tell Gulliver, humans apply only to selfish aims and so bring misery upon themselves.
If this reading plan of great books is to do me any good, I have to apply the lessons they teach. In this case, I have to measure myself by Swift’s yardstick. And in doing so, I have to admit that I spend a lot of time every day thinking and reasoning about how to serve myself – whether physically, mentally, emotionally, or even spiritually – with very little thought of others. So, while the word works well as an insult or descriptive epithet in certain cases, in reality, which of us is not a Yahoo?
Tuesday, July 9, 2013
Saturday, July 6, 2013
Laputians Among Us
I hadn’t remembered anything about part III of Gulliver’s Travels other than that there was a land floating in the air. After about twenty years, I’ve read it again, and now I might see why I put it out of my memory: in this book Swift’s satire comes too close to home. The Laputians, who live on the gravity-defying island, are solely intellectual. Like their country, they aren’t grounded. And their favorite speculative topics are geometry and – wait for it – music theory. Ouch!
Each Laputian has one eye pointed to his breast and one eye pointed to the heavens. (What might Swift thought about Kant and “the starry skies above me and the moral law inside me”?) Almost completely unaware of the world around them, they have servants who slap their ears with balloons when someone is speaking and slap their mouths when it is time to respond. Do others really see music theorists as so detached from all meaningful life as this? Do my freshman?
This society of dreamy philosophers does have a practical side. The Laputians sponsor academies on the ground that work on “practical” problems. One teacher, for instance, has a scheme whereby any weak-minded ignoramus can write books of erudition. The method involves a large machine that randomizes words. Any time a sequence of words anywhere in the result shows grammatical logic, it gets written down. Then these workable sequences get strung together into longer sentences. I’m actually, truly surprised I haven’t heard of any present-day professor of poetry working to actualize this machine. (Now that I think of it, the project would much more likely come from someone in art or music.) I also must admit that I wouldn’t see the enterprise as totally frivolous. But then, as a professor of music theory, I am at the very pinnacle of the Laputian hierarchy.
Each Laputian has one eye pointed to his breast and one eye pointed to the heavens. (What might Swift thought about Kant and “the starry skies above me and the moral law inside me”?) Almost completely unaware of the world around them, they have servants who slap their ears with balloons when someone is speaking and slap their mouths when it is time to respond. Do others really see music theorists as so detached from all meaningful life as this? Do my freshman?
This society of dreamy philosophers does have a practical side. The Laputians sponsor academies on the ground that work on “practical” problems. One teacher, for instance, has a scheme whereby any weak-minded ignoramus can write books of erudition. The method involves a large machine that randomizes words. Any time a sequence of words anywhere in the result shows grammatical logic, it gets written down. Then these workable sequences get strung together into longer sentences. I’m actually, truly surprised I haven’t heard of any present-day professor of poetry working to actualize this machine. (Now that I think of it, the project would much more likely come from someone in art or music.) I also must admit that I wouldn’t see the enterprise as totally frivolous. But then, as a professor of music theory, I am at the very pinnacle of the Laputian hierarchy.
Wednesday, July 3, 2013
Some Helpful Calvin
I’ve reported guardedly about my Calvin readings in past years. I’m in the middle of my 2013 assignment in the Institutes, and so I should record my thoughts again if it’s going to mean anything to have a blog about my reading plan. But I still feel a need for caution. I don’t want to argue with anyone about whether Calvin (or Calvinism) is right or wrong on any certain point; my experience tells me that these arguments don’t change either person and certainly don’t edify me. So once more I’ll just stick with my personal reaction, which can’t really be contradicted. (Hmmm. Ironically, I hope to avoid conflict by being subjective rather than objective.)
I usually find Calvin’s polemical style distasteful even when I agree with his content, which is admittedly most of the time. And this year the Genevan theologian has again set my teeth on edge. This time my fingernails have come into contact with the chalkboard of this statement: “I say nothing of the fact, that [clerical benefices] are conferred on barbers, cooks, grooms, and dross of that sort.” To imitate Calvin, I won’t quibble with him about claiming to say nothing about the very fact that he indeed says something about. But must he call barbers, cooks, and grooms “dross”? I’m not entirely sure what it means to call human beings dross unless it means that they constitute an undesirable element that remains after a trial by fire, a oddment fit only to be disposed of. So I must take the opportunity to support tonsorialists, chefs, and ostlers by professing my strongly held belief that their noble vocations don’t earn them automatic relegation to the trash heap. I certainly don’t see them as occupations of any lower station than that of tax collecting, fishing, or political activism, the original callings of a few of the most prominent church officials of the New Testament era.
In spite of this awkward passage, though, I admit that I’ve found Calvin quite helpful this year. I don’t want to raise any Catholics’ hackles, either, but I have to say that I found Calvin’s critique of papal supremacy pertinent, rational, scholarly, and in some ways quite generous – not final or authoritative by any means, but definitely helpful. He points out some things unsaid in Paul’s letter to the Romans and in his letters written from Rome that could well have been said had that Apostle recognized Peter as the supreme Vicar of Christ. He raises a question I’d never thought about concerning just how long Peter could have resided in Rome if he stayed in Jerusalem for a few years after the Ascension and then served as bishop of Antioch for a period. And he makes some arguments based on early church councils, not just about their findings, but about their structure.
Finally, he has me reading some letters of Gregory the Great that I would not have read otherwise. I’ve learned in the last week that many Catholics interpret these letters in a way opposed to Calvin’s, and that’s interesting to me, as well. As to my interpretation, I’ll just say that early Church history suggests to me that modern-day Catholics ascribe too much to the bishop of Rome, while Protestants (almost all of them, anyway) ascribe too little.
And there I am again in a familiar place: me against the rest of Christendom, when I so desperately only want to be with all the rest of Christendom. But what can I say? Here I stand.
I usually find Calvin’s polemical style distasteful even when I agree with his content, which is admittedly most of the time. And this year the Genevan theologian has again set my teeth on edge. This time my fingernails have come into contact with the chalkboard of this statement: “I say nothing of the fact, that [clerical benefices] are conferred on barbers, cooks, grooms, and dross of that sort.” To imitate Calvin, I won’t quibble with him about claiming to say nothing about the very fact that he indeed says something about. But must he call barbers, cooks, and grooms “dross”? I’m not entirely sure what it means to call human beings dross unless it means that they constitute an undesirable element that remains after a trial by fire, a oddment fit only to be disposed of. So I must take the opportunity to support tonsorialists, chefs, and ostlers by professing my strongly held belief that their noble vocations don’t earn them automatic relegation to the trash heap. I certainly don’t see them as occupations of any lower station than that of tax collecting, fishing, or political activism, the original callings of a few of the most prominent church officials of the New Testament era.
In spite of this awkward passage, though, I admit that I’ve found Calvin quite helpful this year. I don’t want to raise any Catholics’ hackles, either, but I have to say that I found Calvin’s critique of papal supremacy pertinent, rational, scholarly, and in some ways quite generous – not final or authoritative by any means, but definitely helpful. He points out some things unsaid in Paul’s letter to the Romans and in his letters written from Rome that could well have been said had that Apostle recognized Peter as the supreme Vicar of Christ. He raises a question I’d never thought about concerning just how long Peter could have resided in Rome if he stayed in Jerusalem for a few years after the Ascension and then served as bishop of Antioch for a period. And he makes some arguments based on early church councils, not just about their findings, but about their structure.
Finally, he has me reading some letters of Gregory the Great that I would not have read otherwise. I’ve learned in the last week that many Catholics interpret these letters in a way opposed to Calvin’s, and that’s interesting to me, as well. As to my interpretation, I’ll just say that early Church history suggests to me that modern-day Catholics ascribe too much to the bishop of Rome, while Protestants (almost all of them, anyway) ascribe too little.
And there I am again in a familiar place: me against the rest of Christendom, when I so desperately only want to be with all the rest of Christendom. But what can I say? Here I stand.
Sunday, June 30, 2013
Magister Imperatorque Latine
As I read this month through The Truelove and The Wine-Dark Sea, volumes 15 and 16 Patrick O’Brian’s amazing series of novels on the adventures of Captain Jack Aubrey and Stephen Maturin, I kept some notes on Latin phrases that appeared. When I looked them up later, what struck me most was the variety of sources drawn upon. The scope tells us something about Stephen and, of course, his creator.
Several of the phrases come, as expected, from classical literature, revealing a classical education of reading the ancients in their original languages. Non sum qualis eram, “I am not as I was,” comes from Horace’s Odes, IV.1. Two quotations come from Petronius. Foeda est in coitu et brevis voluptas, from a short poem, means, “Filthy and short is the pleasure in copulation.” From the Satyricon we get two lines:
Sic erimus cuncti postquam nos auferet Orcus
ergo vivamus dum licet esse, bene.
Thus will we all be after Orcus carries us away
Therefore let us – as long as it is allowed! – live well.
I don’t remember what scene of death Stephen was looking on when he said these lines, but they make most sense in the presence of human bones. Hamlet’s gravedigger might have expressed such a sentiment. (Hamlet had a different reaction.)
And from Livy’s History comes Vae victis! In 390 B.C., the Gauls took the city of Rome and made the citizens give up a certain amount of gold. When the Romans noticed that the weights used to measure the gold were doctored, the Gauls’ commander, Brennus, shouted, “Vae victis! – Woe to the conquered!” There’s a tinge of sarcasm in the reply. In our time, an era in which Mad magazine’s “Snappy Answers to Stupid Questions” has become a guide to everyday discourse, we might say, “Boo hoo!” or “Go write your Senator,” or “Here’s an uncia. Go call someone who cares.”
A couple of the phrases come, as far as I can make out, from ancient literature but may have reached Stephen through later usages. Lignum vitae is the tree of life from Genesis 2 in Jerome’s Vulgate translation. But in modern times, the phrase identifies the guaiacum tree, which has particularly potent medicinal qualities. And Homo hominis lupus, “Man is a wolf to man,” appears originally in Plautus, but was quoted by later philosophers, notably Hobbes, whom surely Stephen has read. Taedium vitae, which means ennui or perhaps even clinical depression, has no classical source I could locate. But it does appear several times in Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy of 1621, a book doubtless quite familiar to Stephen.
Three phrases appear to be Stephen’s (thus O’Brian’s) original concoctions. Tertium in tabulatum mali, “into the third layer of evil,” recalls the circles of Dante’s Inferno, but that work was written in Florentine Italian. (The Divine Comedy, in fact, played a large part in causing Florentine to become the common language of most of the peninsula.) When asked for the Latin for “pudding,” Stephen offers sebi confectio discolor, “a multicolor composition of animal fat” (or more literally, “of animal fat a composition multicolored”). Finally, I wouldn’t be surprised to learn that educated officers in the Royal Navy commonly said such phrases as nodi decem. But they may not have used a number as high as decem. After all, few ships of the time can match Surprise’s ten knots.
Several of the phrases come, as expected, from classical literature, revealing a classical education of reading the ancients in their original languages. Non sum qualis eram, “I am not as I was,” comes from Horace’s Odes, IV.1. Two quotations come from Petronius. Foeda est in coitu et brevis voluptas, from a short poem, means, “Filthy and short is the pleasure in copulation.” From the Satyricon we get two lines:
Sic erimus cuncti postquam nos auferet Orcus
ergo vivamus dum licet esse, bene.
Thus will we all be after Orcus carries us away
Therefore let us – as long as it is allowed! – live well.
I don’t remember what scene of death Stephen was looking on when he said these lines, but they make most sense in the presence of human bones. Hamlet’s gravedigger might have expressed such a sentiment. (Hamlet had a different reaction.)
And from Livy’s History comes Vae victis! In 390 B.C., the Gauls took the city of Rome and made the citizens give up a certain amount of gold. When the Romans noticed that the weights used to measure the gold were doctored, the Gauls’ commander, Brennus, shouted, “Vae victis! – Woe to the conquered!” There’s a tinge of sarcasm in the reply. In our time, an era in which Mad magazine’s “Snappy Answers to Stupid Questions” has become a guide to everyday discourse, we might say, “Boo hoo!” or “Go write your Senator,” or “Here’s an uncia. Go call someone who cares.”
A couple of the phrases come, as far as I can make out, from ancient literature but may have reached Stephen through later usages. Lignum vitae is the tree of life from Genesis 2 in Jerome’s Vulgate translation. But in modern times, the phrase identifies the guaiacum tree, which has particularly potent medicinal qualities. And Homo hominis lupus, “Man is a wolf to man,” appears originally in Plautus, but was quoted by later philosophers, notably Hobbes, whom surely Stephen has read. Taedium vitae, which means ennui or perhaps even clinical depression, has no classical source I could locate. But it does appear several times in Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy of 1621, a book doubtless quite familiar to Stephen.
Three phrases appear to be Stephen’s (thus O’Brian’s) original concoctions. Tertium in tabulatum mali, “into the third layer of evil,” recalls the circles of Dante’s Inferno, but that work was written in Florentine Italian. (The Divine Comedy, in fact, played a large part in causing Florentine to become the common language of most of the peninsula.) When asked for the Latin for “pudding,” Stephen offers sebi confectio discolor, “a multicolor composition of animal fat” (or more literally, “of animal fat a composition multicolored”). Finally, I wouldn’t be surprised to learn that educated officers in the Royal Navy commonly said such phrases as nodi decem. But they may not have used a number as high as decem. After all, few ships of the time can match Surprise’s ten knots.
Thursday, June 27, 2013
Hope, Fear, Despair, and Presumption
Philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries valued reason so much, they tried to reduce human emotions to their mechanical constituents. Nineteenth-century philosophers, on the other hand, favored the individual, the emotional, the reflective, the inexplicable so much that they romanticized logic, many of them making it the product of a living cosmos that evolved by force of will until it had produced rational creatures who could think about it in amazed self-love. In contrast to both, the scholasticism of Thomas honored reason, authority, empirical evidence, and a deep desire to line up listable things in one-to-one correspondences.
Take the beatitudes, for instance. In his survey of the theological virtues, Thomas wants to assign each of the characteristics praised by Jesus to exactly one of the virtues, even to one associated aspect of one of the virtues. Cleanness of heart, for example, corresponds to the gift of understanding, which works with the virtue of faith. Those who mourn do so from the gift of knowledge, says Aquinas, knowledge being another gift associated with faith. The poor in spirit have filial fear, a gift associated with hope. Correspondences like these seem like stretches to me, but Thomas’s fondness for them comes from a mind that can provide a helpful outline of the components of the spirit-led Christian life, so I smile forgivingly and move on.
The last part of my yearly passage through the Summa Theologica covered the virtue of hope and its associated gifts and vices. Every aspect of Aquinas’s explanation flows from his definition of hope: the longing for a future good, difficult but not impossible to attain. Theological hope has as its object eternal happiness with God. Faith must precede hope, he explains, since one must have the object of hope proposed intellectually. But hope, he goes on to say, precedes love for God in most Christians: we want the happiness for ourselves first and then learn to love God for his own sake.
I was suprised to see Thomas describe fear as both a contrary to hope and a gift of the Holy Spirit, but his analysis made sense to me in the end. After all, the Bible tells us both that fear of God is the beginning of wisdom and that perfect love casts out fear, so there must be some intrinsic tension to the notion. Thomas’s solution is to divide fear into three categories: fear of worldly things, which can turn us away from God; servile fear, that is, the fear of punishment, the fear that, as a famous movie villain once explained, will keep us in line; and filial fear, the fear of separation from God. The second and third types both keep us close to God, but as love grows during our lifetime, it diminishes servile fear and increases filial fear. Even in Heaven, where servile fear is eliminated completely, the Blessed will have a type of filial fear, not in that they actual believe they might lose their eternal reward, but in that they will never cease to wonder that God has granted it. I found this analysis logical and helpful.
Even more helpful in day-to-day life, though, was Aquinas’s accounts of the vices opposed to hope: despair and presumption. Both are sins in that they insist on a false view of God. Despair knows of God’s justice, but the despairing soul acts on the belief that God’s mercy could never apply to her. Presumption, on the other hand, has every confidence in God’s mercy, but the person who presumes on that mercy believes that God’s justice doesn’t have anything to do with him individually. The definition of hope comes in very handy here. The desparate sees eternal happiness as impossible to attain, while the presumptuous sees its achievement as not arduous at all.
Now here’s where I might part with Thomas on his neat correspondence schemes. Presumption he aligns with the mortal sin of vainglory, or pride; the presuming soul values himself so highly, thinks of himself as so special, that he can’t believe anything he does could deserve God’s punishment. Thomas then sees despair arising from (or should it be descending from?) the sin of sloth. But can’t despair come also from a kind of pride? I’ve known a couple of people who feared they’d done something special enough to put them forever outside God’s forgiveness. Really? You’re so special that your sins are categorically worse than mine?
Take the beatitudes, for instance. In his survey of the theological virtues, Thomas wants to assign each of the characteristics praised by Jesus to exactly one of the virtues, even to one associated aspect of one of the virtues. Cleanness of heart, for example, corresponds to the gift of understanding, which works with the virtue of faith. Those who mourn do so from the gift of knowledge, says Aquinas, knowledge being another gift associated with faith. The poor in spirit have filial fear, a gift associated with hope. Correspondences like these seem like stretches to me, but Thomas’s fondness for them comes from a mind that can provide a helpful outline of the components of the spirit-led Christian life, so I smile forgivingly and move on.
The last part of my yearly passage through the Summa Theologica covered the virtue of hope and its associated gifts and vices. Every aspect of Aquinas’s explanation flows from his definition of hope: the longing for a future good, difficult but not impossible to attain. Theological hope has as its object eternal happiness with God. Faith must precede hope, he explains, since one must have the object of hope proposed intellectually. But hope, he goes on to say, precedes love for God in most Christians: we want the happiness for ourselves first and then learn to love God for his own sake.
I was suprised to see Thomas describe fear as both a contrary to hope and a gift of the Holy Spirit, but his analysis made sense to me in the end. After all, the Bible tells us both that fear of God is the beginning of wisdom and that perfect love casts out fear, so there must be some intrinsic tension to the notion. Thomas’s solution is to divide fear into three categories: fear of worldly things, which can turn us away from God; servile fear, that is, the fear of punishment, the fear that, as a famous movie villain once explained, will keep us in line; and filial fear, the fear of separation from God. The second and third types both keep us close to God, but as love grows during our lifetime, it diminishes servile fear and increases filial fear. Even in Heaven, where servile fear is eliminated completely, the Blessed will have a type of filial fear, not in that they actual believe they might lose their eternal reward, but in that they will never cease to wonder that God has granted it. I found this analysis logical and helpful.
Even more helpful in day-to-day life, though, was Aquinas’s accounts of the vices opposed to hope: despair and presumption. Both are sins in that they insist on a false view of God. Despair knows of God’s justice, but the despairing soul acts on the belief that God’s mercy could never apply to her. Presumption, on the other hand, has every confidence in God’s mercy, but the person who presumes on that mercy believes that God’s justice doesn’t have anything to do with him individually. The definition of hope comes in very handy here. The desparate sees eternal happiness as impossible to attain, while the presumptuous sees its achievement as not arduous at all.
Now here’s where I might part with Thomas on his neat correspondence schemes. Presumption he aligns with the mortal sin of vainglory, or pride; the presuming soul values himself so highly, thinks of himself as so special, that he can’t believe anything he does could deserve God’s punishment. Thomas then sees despair arising from (or should it be descending from?) the sin of sloth. But can’t despair come also from a kind of pride? I’ve known a couple of people who feared they’d done something special enough to put them forever outside God’s forgiveness. Really? You’re so special that your sins are categorically worse than mine?
Saturday, June 22, 2013
Increase Your Word Power with Patrick O’Brian – 2013
What am I to say about volumes 15 and 16 in a series of novels with a devoted following? Yes, I could talk about the fascinating character of Clarissa Oakes and Dr Maturin’s relationship with her. Or I could talk about a chase through a field of icebergs or a climb through the Andes. But if you’ve read these books, you love them and don’t need my view of them, while if you haven’t read them, it will take you a while to get here. (And by the way, if you like history, adventure, sailing, anatomy, geology, zoology, anthropology, world travel, human geography, religion, political science, espionage, music, literature, humor, and drama, start reading Master and Commander as soon as possible.)
But last year I posted a vocabulary quiz that the online O’Brian community seemed to enjoy. So this year, I’m offering a new challenge, with twenty-five words I encountered these last ten days in The Truelove and The Wine-Dark Sea. Match each word in the numbered list with a definition from the second, lettered list. Answers are given below.
1. advowson
2. atrabilious
3. casuistical
4. cholagogue
5. contund
6. coruscate
7. crapulous
8. crepitation
9. daedal
10. farinaceous
11. firkin
12. gelid
13. gimbals
14. glebe
15. hieratic
16. idoneus
17. mephitic
18. objurgation
19. pantisocratic
20. scelerate
21. scoria
22. subjacent
23. supererogation
24. temerarious
25. thaumaturge
a. to give off bright light
b. melancholy; peevish
c. priestly; highly formal
d. notably wicked
e. a substance that promotes the flow of bile
f. icy
g. skillful
h. rebuke
i. the refuse from melting metals; cindery lava
j. having a mealy surface
k. pound, bruise
l. performance of more than is required by duty
m. a suspended support that allows an object to remain level during transport
n. the right to present a nominee for a benefice
o. a crackling sound
p. suitable
q. foul-smelling
r. land yielding revenue to a parish church
s. marked by specious or rationalizing argument
t. magician
u. presumptuous
v. lower than though not directly below
w. marked by intemperance in food or drink
x. characterized by (or believing in) universal equality in government
y. a small vessel with a capacity equal to 1/4 barrel
Don’t scroll any farther until you’re ready!
T
H
E
A
N
S
W
E
R
S
1-n, 2-b, 3-s, 4-e, 5-k, 6-a, 7-w, 8-o, 9-g, 10-j, 11-y, 12-f, 13-m, 14-r, 15-c, 16-p, 17-q, 18-h, 19-x, 20-d, 21-I, 22-v, 23-l, 24-u, 25-t
But last year I posted a vocabulary quiz that the online O’Brian community seemed to enjoy. So this year, I’m offering a new challenge, with twenty-five words I encountered these last ten days in The Truelove and The Wine-Dark Sea. Match each word in the numbered list with a definition from the second, lettered list. Answers are given below.
1. advowson
2. atrabilious
3. casuistical
4. cholagogue
5. contund
6. coruscate
7. crapulous
8. crepitation
9. daedal
10. farinaceous
11. firkin
12. gelid
13. gimbals
14. glebe
15. hieratic
16. idoneus
17. mephitic
18. objurgation
19. pantisocratic
20. scelerate
21. scoria
22. subjacent
23. supererogation
24. temerarious
25. thaumaturge
a. to give off bright light
b. melancholy; peevish
c. priestly; highly formal
d. notably wicked
e. a substance that promotes the flow of bile
f. icy
g. skillful
h. rebuke
i. the refuse from melting metals; cindery lava
j. having a mealy surface
k. pound, bruise
l. performance of more than is required by duty
m. a suspended support that allows an object to remain level during transport
n. the right to present a nominee for a benefice
o. a crackling sound
p. suitable
q. foul-smelling
r. land yielding revenue to a parish church
s. marked by specious or rationalizing argument
t. magician
u. presumptuous
v. lower than though not directly below
w. marked by intemperance in food or drink
x. characterized by (or believing in) universal equality in government
y. a small vessel with a capacity equal to 1/4 barrel
Don’t scroll any farther until you’re ready!
T
H
E
A
N
S
W
E
R
S
1-n, 2-b, 3-s, 4-e, 5-k, 6-a, 7-w, 8-o, 9-g, 10-j, 11-y, 12-f, 13-m, 14-r, 15-c, 16-p, 17-q, 18-h, 19-x, 20-d, 21-I, 22-v, 23-l, 24-u, 25-t
Saturday, June 15, 2013
Ending with Peirce
After many years of hearing about and reading about Charles Peirce, I finally finished reading a comprehensive selection of the writings of Peirce himself. In March the experience started very positively. The introduction to my reader, by Justus Buchler, provided a very clear overview, and the first selections gradually built a coherent edifice. Peirce’s system explained logic, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, psychology, science, and mathematics, and I began to see why he has been called the greatest American philosopher.
A couple of weeks ago, I finished the book, but if I can continue with the house-building metaphor, I must say that the roof looked full of holes and on the verge of collapse. Peirce started out sounding like Aristotle to me but ended up sounding like Hegel without the force of his picturesque, Romantic prose style. Consider the following neat brickwork. According to Peirce, a probabilistic syllogism consists of rule, case, and result. (That covers logic.) In the mental process, the rule corresponds to a habit (i.e. knowledge), the case to a sensation, and the result to a volition. (There’s psychology.) Looking for the result is called deduction, for the rule, induction, and for the case or cause, hypothesis or abduction. (And there’s epistemology.) And science, he says, has need for all three searches: the formulation of rules, the identification of causes, and the prediction of results. Everything works together so well, it seems that Peirce has uncovered the pattern of the universe, the thread that binds the human and the natural.
But then I discover that Peirce says universal laws are not fixed, that they evolve along with everything else. Really? Even the laws of the syllogism? His argument for evolution of law begins with the observation of the diversity of the universe. Science seems to indicate that everything works by laws, but that’s only because it looks at things that act uniformly. If we could get ourselves interested in the chaotic multiplicity all around us, we’d see that chance must happen in the universe. The universe could not have started out uniform and developed variety (unless true chance exists, which means the universe wasn’t really totally uniform to begin with). So it must have begun in fortuitous chaos, after which laws evolved. I want to ask, how does he know that it evolved either one way or the other? Could it not have started out with both law and chance, determinism and indeterminism, and then continued with each operating in its own sphere?
Peirce also loses me when he says that only by accepting the existence of chance can we explain personality. He sounds a lot like C. S. Lewis for a moment when he points out that if our thoughts were deterministic, they couldn’t be logical, not even the thought that thoughts are deterministic. But then he diverges sharply from Lewis’s argument against naturalism. Having tossed out determinism, Peirce says he’s proved that chance exists. Are those the only two choices? If the mind works by chance, then haven’t we lost logic and personality just as much as when we accept total determinism?
But Peirce does see and accept personality and mind. In one of the final sections of the book, he says that in order to explain the two fundamental facts, mind and matter, we have only three choices: either mind is principle, or matter is principle, or they are co-equal. Materialism he rejects as “repugnant” to logic (although I think he might mean that it pulls the rug out from under logic – the argument I referred to in the previous paragraph). Dualism he rejects by Occam’s Razor. (Is Occam’s Razor an epistemological law that merely evolved?) So what’s left is . . . Despite his hasty dismissal of the first two theories, I was excited to see him exalt the mind of God as the ultimate reality, the last viable option. But instead, when he determines that mind is the principle of existence, he concludes that “the one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind.” The dessicated corpse of mind? Really? Several billion people believe one way or another that matter is not mind but was created by a divine mind. Is the theory of the majority of the earth’s population really beneath notice?
A couple of weeks ago, I finished the book, but if I can continue with the house-building metaphor, I must say that the roof looked full of holes and on the verge of collapse. Peirce started out sounding like Aristotle to me but ended up sounding like Hegel without the force of his picturesque, Romantic prose style. Consider the following neat brickwork. According to Peirce, a probabilistic syllogism consists of rule, case, and result. (That covers logic.) In the mental process, the rule corresponds to a habit (i.e. knowledge), the case to a sensation, and the result to a volition. (There’s psychology.) Looking for the result is called deduction, for the rule, induction, and for the case or cause, hypothesis or abduction. (And there’s epistemology.) And science, he says, has need for all three searches: the formulation of rules, the identification of causes, and the prediction of results. Everything works together so well, it seems that Peirce has uncovered the pattern of the universe, the thread that binds the human and the natural.
But then I discover that Peirce says universal laws are not fixed, that they evolve along with everything else. Really? Even the laws of the syllogism? His argument for evolution of law begins with the observation of the diversity of the universe. Science seems to indicate that everything works by laws, but that’s only because it looks at things that act uniformly. If we could get ourselves interested in the chaotic multiplicity all around us, we’d see that chance must happen in the universe. The universe could not have started out uniform and developed variety (unless true chance exists, which means the universe wasn’t really totally uniform to begin with). So it must have begun in fortuitous chaos, after which laws evolved. I want to ask, how does he know that it evolved either one way or the other? Could it not have started out with both law and chance, determinism and indeterminism, and then continued with each operating in its own sphere?
Peirce also loses me when he says that only by accepting the existence of chance can we explain personality. He sounds a lot like C. S. Lewis for a moment when he points out that if our thoughts were deterministic, they couldn’t be logical, not even the thought that thoughts are deterministic. But then he diverges sharply from Lewis’s argument against naturalism. Having tossed out determinism, Peirce says he’s proved that chance exists. Are those the only two choices? If the mind works by chance, then haven’t we lost logic and personality just as much as when we accept total determinism?
But Peirce does see and accept personality and mind. In one of the final sections of the book, he says that in order to explain the two fundamental facts, mind and matter, we have only three choices: either mind is principle, or matter is principle, or they are co-equal. Materialism he rejects as “repugnant” to logic (although I think he might mean that it pulls the rug out from under logic – the argument I referred to in the previous paragraph). Dualism he rejects by Occam’s Razor. (Is Occam’s Razor an epistemological law that merely evolved?) So what’s left is . . . Despite his hasty dismissal of the first two theories, I was excited to see him exalt the mind of God as the ultimate reality, the last viable option. But instead, when he determines that mind is the principle of existence, he concludes that “the one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind.” The dessicated corpse of mind? Really? Several billion people believe one way or another that matter is not mind but was created by a divine mind. Is the theory of the majority of the earth’s population really beneath notice?
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